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INFORMATION SECURITY, CONTRACT AND LIABILITY
JENNIFER CHANDLER*
INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is a complex social problem for two reasons. First, the
Internet has an insecure technical foundation,' and second, technology is
changing rapidly, creating many possible points of failure.
I. VALUING THE PUBLIC GOOD
One of the key problems is that cyber security is a public good.
Among the causes of cyber insecurity are the vulnerable or compromised
computers of individual users, which are used to spread malware, spam, or
other harmful communications. Individuals may invest in the security of
their computers and so benefit both themselves and the public in general.
However, in cases where the public benefits, the individuals do not capture
all of the benefits from their investments in cyber security, and so they may
not have sufficient incentives to make the level of investment that is optim-
al from the public perspective. The result is a classic free rider problem:
people either wait for someone else to produce the security or, if they do
invest, they do not produce the best kind or quantity of security.
A. Free Riders and Investments in Security
Law and economics scholars suggest that there are two types of pri-
vate security investments. One type of investment tends to lower the
amount of crime generally. This includes investments that help to detect
and catch criminals as well as investments in hidden security measures that
raise the general cost of committing crime, thereby decreasing the amount
of crime. The second type of security investment merely shifts the crime
* Jennifer Chandler is a professor of law at University of Ottawa. This is the text of Professor
Chandler's remarks at the Center for Information Research Conference. Jennifer Chandler, Address at
the University of Florida's Center for Information Research Conference: Data Devolution: Corporate
Information Security, Consumers and the Future of Regulation (Feb. 3-4, 2006).
1. Jennifer A. Chandler, Improving Software Security: A Discussion of Liability for Unreasona-
bly Insecure Software, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 155 (Chander, Gelman & Radin
eds., 2007).
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elsewhere and does not produce a net social benefit. Examples of the
second type include visible security measures like locks on doors or win-
dows, advertisements for security systems, or private security guards. The
justification for this type of investment is self-interest; it provides protec-
tion by encouraging criminals to go elsewhere.
Interestingly, cyber security does not map neatly onto this dichotomy.
Private self-protective measures in cyber security neither shift the crime
elsewhere nor lower the level of crime by making crime less attractive.
Instead, efforts taken to protect one's computer from compromise directly
benefit many other people from harm in the form of distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks, 2 spam, phishing, and the propagation of malware
because networks of compromised computers are commonly used to launch
these forms of attack. Therefore, a more accurate analogy between cyber-
space and real space security investments would be to view cyber security
measures as akin to barred windows that prevent a house from being occu-
pied by a sniper bent on attacking others from the house. Thus, the issue is
no longer the protection of an individual asset.
B. The Harms of Cyber Insecurity
Although computer security is primarily a concern of each computer
owner, a large number of third parties depend on the security of other us-
ers' computers. This creates a situation where computer owners may take
steps to protect their own computers for their own benefit and are willing to
invest money and time to do so, but they will not necessarily want to take
into account the interests of either these third parties or the public interest.
As a result, information security is often insufficient to protect the public
interest.
As mentioned above, an inadequately secured computer may be com-
promised and then integrated into a network of compromised computers
known as a "botnet. ''3 In some cases, botnet membership is not necessarily
too great an inconvenience to the owner of the compromised computer, but
the botnet may be used for a range of nefarious purposes against other In-
ternet users. In other cases, the user of the computer directly bears the harm
from the compromise of that user's computer, as is the case with spyware.
2. For a discussion of denial of service attacks, see, for example, Jennifer A. Chandler, Security
in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, I U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 233,
233-37 (2004).
3. For a discussion of botnets, see, for example, Jennifer A. Chandler, Liability for Botnet At-
tacks, 5 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13-18 (2006); Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial
of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23, 23-59 (2006).
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Some forms of spyware stay on a computer, log key strokes, and try to
intercept financial data for use in fraudulent transactions. Undoubtedly, this
theft causes inconvenience to the person whose credit card number is com-
promised. Yet, considerable inconvenience is caused to others, such as
merchants who become subjects of credit card charge backs after disputes
of fraudulent transactions, and, by extension, all consumers who bear the
increased cost of products due to the amount of fraud.
C. Creating Security-Enhancing Incentives Through Tort Liability
The question of how to deal with inadequate cyber security has be-
come an international public policy problem. Two possible solutions are to
impose liability for developing unreasonably insecure software and harbor-
ing botnets on networks.
Identification of an appropriate plaintiff is one of the obstacles in us-
ing tort law as a solution. For example, software flaws are key sources of
computer insecurity. Yet, the purchasers of software are usually contrac-
tually bound by end user license agreements ("EULAs"), which contain
generic disclaimers about fitness, functionality, or quality, as well as exclu-
sions of liability exempting the vendors from any problems that arise from
defects. 4 As a possible solution, a party not bound by an EULA could be
the plaintiff.5 For example, in the case of a DDoS attack, the target of the
attack would make a logical plaintiff:6 This party was harmed by an attack
launched by the infected computers and is not bound by the relevant EU-
LAs. 7 But this article focuses on the role of contracts, and so will not fur-
ther discuss these tort arguments. Contractual provisions, particularly in
software EULAs, can exacerbate the cyber security problem. Arguably, a
legal solution is needed: either a regulation that invalidates certain types of
provisions or a common law objection based on public policy.
II. CONTRACT
Various kinds of provisions found in software EULAs undermine
cyber security. 8 The public cannot depend upon software purchasers to
4. For a discussion of vendor liability, see, for example, Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for
Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 425-85 (2008).
5. Chandler, supra note 1, at 155-58; Jennifer A. Chandler, Security in Cyberspace: Combating
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, I U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 233, 233-37 (2004); Jennifer A.
Chandler, Liability for Botnet Attacks, 5 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13-18 (2006).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. For further discussion, see Jennifer A. Chandler, Contracting Insecurity: Software License
Terms that Undermine Cybersecurity, in HARBORING DATA: CORPORATIONS, LAW AND INFORMATION
2010]
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resist these provisions for several reasons. First, there is an externality
problem: People may consent to the terms that impose costs elsewhere
because they either do not know or care enough about the external costs.
Second, contracts sometimes insufficiently disclose the security-
undermining features of software. In any event, disclosure is unlikely to
help, given that people simply do not read EULAs. Thus, as a matter of
contract law, the only viable way to discourage the inclusion of these kinds
of terms and, therefore, to minimize these negative externalities is to refuse
to enforce the harmful contractual terms and to deny legal protection to
arrangements that undermine cyber security.
A. The Sony Rootkit
The Sony Rootkit debacle is an example of the problem of inadequate
information disclosure in EULAs. 9 It involved "copy protection" or "digital
rights management" software included on a number of Sony music CDs.
The existence of the software was disclosed in the EULA, although it was
questionable whether it was properly disclosed.10 The rootkit was installed
at a low level in a purchaser's computer, enabling writers of malware to
design harmful programs to take advantage of the newly-introduced vulne-
rability. As the fiasco unfolded, Sony made available an uninstaller pro-
gram, which created a further serious security risk, thus necessitating a
second uninstaller for the first uninstaller. I I
Predictably, a number of class actions and government investigations
ensued, raising a number of claims, including those under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, under state laws prohibiting deceptive marketing
practices and false advertising, and under various other grounds. A New
York Court approved a settlement that contained several relevant terms, 12
including disclosure requirements for the installation of copy protection
software and for the function of any updates or changes. The settlement
also required Sony to obtain an opinion from an independent, qualified
SECURITY 3-6 (A.M. Matwyshyn, ed., 2009).
9. For a discussion of the Sony Rootkit issues, see, for example, Bruce Schneier, Real Story of
the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/ 0,1848,69601,00.html.
10. For the purposes of this article, it does not matter whether disclosure was adequate, because
increased disclosure is likely insufficient to deal with the problem since people usually do not read
EULAs.
11. J. Alex Halderman, Not Again! Uninstaller for Other Sony DRM Also Opens Huge Security
Hole, FREEDOM TO TINKER, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p--931; John Leyden,
First Trojan using Sony DRM spotted. Roots you, Sir, REGISTER, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 2005/11 /10/ sonydrmjtrojan/.
12. Settlement Agreement, In re SONY BMG CD Technologies Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No.
1:05-cv-0975).
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third party that the copy protection software did not damage computer se-
curity, and that the software met some security standard.13
But because most users do not read EULAs, this improved disclosure
alone seems unlikely to solve the problem. In this case, the copy protection
software installed on users' computers benefits the licensor rather than the
licensee, and also increases the vulnerability of computer systems. The
software harms the owner of the computer as well as third parties because
vulnerable computers may be compromised and used to launch attacks on
third parties. Licensors should not be permitted to insulate themselves from
complaints merely by disclosing the existence of such copy protection
software in the EULA.
B. Network Associates Anti-Benchmarking Provisions
Another example concerning EULA disclosures occurred in 2003
when the Attorney General of New York sued Network Associates because
of an anti-benchmarking provision in a Network Associates EULA that
prohibited the publication of a comparison of its firewall product with oth-
ers. 14 The New York Attorney General questioned whether it was in the
public's interest to suppress this kind of information. More generally, the
concern is that free and open discussion of software quality is necessary to
both ensure public knowledge of defects and exert public pressure on soft-
ware manufacturers to prevent or fix security vulnerabilities in their prod-
ucts.
Unfortunately, the New York Supreme Court did not actually rule on
whether anti-benchmarking provisions are contrary to public policy or
not.15 Instead, the ruling was quite narrow and stated only that the particu-
lar provision in this case was deceptive. 16
Anti-benchmarking provisions are another example of a contractual
impediment to cyber security. A bench mark test is designed to test the
performance of a software program and to make a meaningful comparison
with similar software programs. On the one hand, these tests are useful to
software purchasers who are unable to assess software quality and make
well-informed purchase decisions on their own. On the other hand, soft-
ware vendors argue that benchmark tests can be misleading because inde-
pendent testers may either test the wrong version or pick inappropriate
metrics. Where there are problems with a test, it is difficult for a software
13. Id.
14. Spitzer v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
15. Id.
16. Id.
20101
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
vendor to criticize a benchmark test because the vendor's complaints are
likely to be construed as sour grapes. As a result, vendors may have unders-
tandable reasons to wish to control benchmark testing of their products.
Anti-benchmarking provisions are a subset of a larger category of
"contracts of silence," which are themselves very controversial. Confiden-
tial settlement agreements in the context of product liability dispute are
another example of a contract in which a party agrees to remain silent in
exchange for some benefit. These agreements are also controversial be-
cause they involve the suppression of publicly useful information. Al-
though we do not wish to promote the public interest by forcing people to
speak unwillingly, we should consider whether the law should promote
freedom of contract so that contracts of silence are blindly enforced. Parties
to a contract of silence will judge the contract's terms according to their
private interests and are unlikely to consider the public harms and the full
social cost of the contract.
III. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CONTRACT RIGHTS
These examples illustrate how contractual arrangements between con-
senting parties may erode cyber security. As a result, the next inquiry is
whether courts should enforce these contractual arrangements. Before en-
gaging in this inquiry, it is important to address the meaning of the idea of
"freedom of contract."
One must distinguish the ability to engage in a transaction from the
right to have the state enable that ability by enforcing a transaction. In lib-
eral theory terms, this is the distinction between a negative and a positive
right. Although liberalism is receptive to claims of negative rights-rights
to be free of state interference in one's actions-it is another thing to make
claims of positive rights that the apparatus and resources of the state be
used in a positive sense to give effect to our own desires. The claim to
"freedom of contract" confounds these two ideas of rights, but it is very
important to keep the ideas separate when analyzing the appropriate role of
the state in enforcing contracts.
The rhetoric of the freedom of contract should be set aside when de-
termining whether contracts should be enforced. Courts must weigh the
advantages of default rules that favor contractual enforcement, such as
predictability and certainty, against the disadvantages of enforcing con-
tracts that undermine the public interest. Even at the height of judicial defe-
rence to freedom of contract in the nineteenth century, judges invalidated
contracts that they considered contrary to public policy. These included
contracts deemed in restraint of trade, and those that pertained to sexual
(Vol 84:3
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immorality as it was conceived at the time. As Atiyah's study of the free-
dom of contract argues, the only thing that has changed over the last couple
hundred years is not the strength of freedom of contract, but the importance
of the particular public policy that collides with the so-called freedom of
contract. 17
Although the refusal to enforce contracts that are contrary to public
policy may undermine the value of freedom of contract, the doctrine of
unenforceability on grounds of public policy is the doctrine best able to
deal with externality problems. Certainly, judges are leery of using the
doctrine of unenforceability on grounds of public policy. They are con-
cemed that it is not their role to pronounce the public policy, and they do
not have the resources or the ability to identify the various interests that
might be affected by whatever they recognize and apply as public policy.
Judges state that public policy determination is a job for the legislatures.
Nonetheless, in some well-defined situations, judges are willing to act to
promote public policy.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a general balancing
test: A contract is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if the interest
in its enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against the en-
forcement of such terms. 18 As a legal test, this leaves a certain amount of
specificity to be desired. The Restatement goes on to say that in making the
determination, a court should consider the strength of the policy as mani-
fested by legislation or judicial decisions.] 9
A. Unenforceability and Public Policy
Applying the Restatement approach to the two examples, the Sony
Rootkit would be unlikely to generate a court pronouncement on public
policy and the Sony EULA. But a term that exempts a party from tort lia-
bility for harm that was caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable
on public policy grounds.20 Arguably, Sony's rootkit constituted a reckless-
ly-imposed harm, and, therefore, the liability disclaimers in the Sony
EULA should not have been enforced. Vendors need a solid incentive to
perform proper security testing, and the refusal to enforce disclaimers of
liability would encourage this behavior. Accordingly, we should consider
imposing strict liability on vendors whose copy protection software intro-
17. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 778 (Oxford University Press
1985).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 195.
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duces new security vulnerabilities in users' computers.
Turning to the anti-benchmarking provisions, it is unfortunate that the
Network Associates court did not discuss the public policy implications of
anti-benchmarking provisions. In my view, an anti-benchmarking provision
should not be enforceable because (a) it suppresses critical information
about software quality in a market with high information costs, and (b)
other mechanisms exist to address the legitimate concerns of software de-
velopers. We have causes of action for trade libel and other ways to deal
with improperly conducted bench mark tests. They may be cumbersome,
but they exist.
B. Future Paths
Courts have demonstrated the desire to protect the information mar-
ketplace. In 1915, a newspaper, which advised Britons buying land in Can-
ada, agreed not to comment on a particular land vendor in exchange for the
forgiveness of a debt.21 The English court stated that this was contrary to
public policy because it was inconsistent with the proper role of a newspa-
per. This is a precedent for the judicial protection of the information market
place.
States have also addressed problematic contractual provisions through
statutory measures. A statute can directly prohibit certain kinds of contrac-
tual provisions. Under both Canadian and American consumer protection
laws, consumers cannot waive certain rights that are provided under the
legislation. This removes a degree of freedom of contract to protect con-
sumers from themselves.
The third approach is illustrated by Canada's comprehensive federal
statute that protects personal information privacy. 22 The statute provides
that personal information can be collected if the affected people consent. It
is thus a consent-based regime, which raises the possibility that parties
might contract around its protections, contrary to the interests of the weaker
parties. However, the statute provides that notwithstanding consent, per-
sonal information may be collected only for reasonable purposes-uses that
a reasonable person would consider appropriate. 23 In other words, although
individuals can consent to some things, there is a minimal floor that they
cannot contract around. 24 The statute also provides that businesses cannot,
as a condition of supplying a product or service, require someone to con-
21. Neville v. Dominion of Canada News Co. Ltd., (1914) 3 Eng. Rep. 556 (K.B.).
22. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 C. Gaz., ch. 5 (Can.).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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sent to the collection of personal information beyond that which is required
to fulfill legitimate purposes. 25 This is an example of a method by which a
minimum level of protection, defined by an objective standard, is guaran-
teed by statute.
In the end, either the courts or the legislature will need to take steps to
limit the use of contractual provisions that undermine cyber security.
25. Id.
2010] 849

